The Effects of Ambiguity Tolerance and User Discretion on Spatial Task Performance and Display Choices by Grant, Russell et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
PACIS 2010 Proceedings Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems(PACIS)
2010
The Effects of Ambiguity Tolerance and User
Discretion on Spatial Task Performance and
Display Choices
Russell Grant
University of Kentucky, rr_mozart@yahoo.com
Milton Shen
University of Kentucky, milton.shen@uky.edu
Melody Carswell
University of Kentucky, cmcars00@gmail.com
Radhika Santhanam
University of Kentucky, santhan@email.uky.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2010
This material is brought to you by the Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been
accepted for inclusion in PACIS 2010 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please
contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Grant, Russell; Shen, Milton; Carswell, Melody; and Santhanam, Radhika, "The Effects of Ambiguity Tolerance and User Discretion
on Spatial Task Performance and Display Choices" (2010). PACIS 2010 Proceedings. 130.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2010/130
THE EFFECTS OF AMBIGUITY TOLERANCE AND  
USER DISCRETION ON SPATIAL TASK PERFORMANCE 
AND DISPLAY CHOICES 
Russell Grant, Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA, 
rr_mozart@yahoo.com 
Milton Shen, School of Management, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA, 
milton.shen@uky.edu 
Melody Carswell, Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA, 
cmcars00@gmail.com 
Radhika Santhanam, School of Management, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA, 
santhan@email.uky.edu 
Abstract 
Recent improvements in information technologies have led to the creation and advancement of 
numerous interfaces or visual displays. However, not all innovations in visual representations 
optimize their users’ decisional performance. This research examines whether granting users 
discretion improves their decisional accuracy and expedites their decision making, as well as reduces 
their stress and mental workload. In addition, the current study utilizes an extensive, relatively stable 
construct in cognitive psychology – ambiguity tolerance – to represent individuals’ openness to 
complexities and investigates the impacts on those decisional outcomes. The mixed results yield 
implications for future studies. 
 




In an age when technology is crucial to existence, visual displays are found ubiquitously and in every 
decisional aid. Examples range from maps of troops in Iraq, to charts depicting stock prices, to graphs 
showing pressure and heat inside a nuclear reactor. Nevertheless, research shows that using 
inappropriate visual displays degrades task performance by unnecessarily increasing the decision 
makers’ mental workload and associated cognitive costs (Jarvenpaa et al. 1988; Vessey 1991; Wilson 
et al. 1999). 
Cognitive fit theory (CFT) asserts that the congruence between tasks and display formats determines 
decisional performance, suggesting that no visual display is perfect for every task. Thus, providing 
multiple visual displays and granting users with discretion to choose among those displays for various 
tasks seem an appropriate approach to improve decisional effectiveness and efficiency. As a pilot 
study, this research investigates the impacts of user discretion on decisional performance, stress, and 
mental workload. Also, the current study explores how individuals’ openness to the given 
complexities of a display design or a task influences their decisional outcomes. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of theoretical 
foundations and our research hypotheses. In Section 3 we propose the research design, and in Section 
4 we show the experimental results. Section 5 concludes with limitations and conclusions. 
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
As the availability, performance, and cost-effectiveness of information technology constantly 
increase, numerous tools and decision-aids have been developed to improve decision makers’ 
effectiveness and efficiency. However, not all technological innovations in visual representations 
successfully lead to improvements in their users’ decisional performance (Tufte 2001). For example, 
three-dimensional (3D) graphs, maps, or other representations are increasingly used and advocated in 
the media, communications, and entertainments (e.g., Google Earth, 3D charts, virtual reality.) St. 
John et al. (2001) indicated that 3D displays are better for shape-understanding tasks, whereas two-
dimensional (2D) displays contribute more to the recognition of relative positions. Bailey et al. (2007) 
found that 3D displays were useful only for tasks in which all three spatial dimensions must be used. 
Using 3D displays for pure 2D tasks (e.g., driving directions from City A to City B) actually degraded 
performance when compared with those using 2D displays. Both studies suggested that an extra 
dimension itself or newly developed technology does not guarantee better decisional performance. 
According to Vessey’s cognitive fit theory (CFT; see Figure 1), when the problem-representation and 
problem-solving tasks match, decision makers can formulate mental representations for task solutions 
more effectively and efficiently, leading to better decisional performance (Vessey 1991). A recent 
survey of more than one hundred studies on the applications of cognitive fit indicated that CFT is a 
robust theory that generalizes to any situation where tasks and problem representations are involved 
(Vessey 2006). One of CFT’s implications is that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find a 
problem representation that can optimize the decisional performance for every problem-solving task. 
Thus, offering multiple interfaces or visual displays is an appropriate way for system developers to 
render information, so that users can discretionarily choose the best representation to satisfy their own 
need. For example, on top of additional information (e.g., traffic, bicycling, real estate), Google Maps 
provides three different views – traditional map, satellite, and terrain, and allows its users to 




Figure 1 Cognitive Fit Theory 
 
2.1 User Discretion 
2.1.1 User Discretion and Decisional Performance 
Before offering user discretion to problem solvers, it is crucial to examine whether their decisional 
performance will be improved. On one hand, using preferred visual displays may decrease decision 
makers’ cognitive workload and associated costs, resulting in better decisional performance (Vessey 
1991). On the other hand, user discretion may allow decision makers who have familiarity bias or 
display inertia to fixate on a specific type of interface or visual display that they have learned or 
frequently used (i.e., usually 2D displays) (Baddoo et al. 2003; Sena et al. 1988), even when a novel 
format is more task-compatible than their preferred displays (Bailey et al. 2007). Another bias in the 
selection of displays is naïve realism, or a tendency for users and some designers to prefer more 
photorealistic renderings of information based on their intuition that more realistic-looking displays 
must be more accurate (e.g., 3D rather than 2D displays of geospatial information) (Smallman et al. 
2005). Those strong preferences in visual displays may lead to suboptimal decisional performance and 
thwart the intent of offering users more discretion. Thus, this research does not predict specific 
associations between user discretion and decisional performance. 
H1-1: Users’ decisional performance increases when they can choose their visual displays. 
H1-2: Users’ decisional performance decreases when they can choose their visual displays. 
2.1.2 User Discretion and Stress 
Considerable research has noted that the increase of user discretion decreases job stress (Averill 1973; 
Lazarus 1966; Lefcourt 1973). Karasek (1979) proposed that the degree of stress on a job is a function 
of both the strength of demands and the amount of decision latitude, or the amount of discretion 
permitted to the individual (Morrison et al. 2001). Specifically, she proposed that job stress will be the 
lowest when decision latitude is high and job demands are low. Payne’s model was similar, (as cited 
by Morrison & Payne 2001); however; he applied the concepts of decision latitude and demands very 
broadly, which is consistent with Averill’s hypothesis that a variety of situations may give an 
individual the impression of discretion, including ―decisional control‖ (Averill 1973). Demands can 
have a variety of meanings from time constraints to specific attributes of performance (Morrison & 
Payne 2001). Thus, the presence of choice in the decision-making process may decrease 
psychological stress.  
H2: Users’ stress decreases when they can choose their visual displays. 
2.1.3 User Discretion and Mental Workload 
When given the choice of display, individuals may experience lower stress because of a likely 
increase in decision latitude, but the implementation of choice may increase task complexity. That is, 
individuals will not only have to be engaged in the task but they will also have to be both meta-
cognitively and situationally aware if they are oriented toward improving their performance. For 
example, display users will not only have to monitor their strategies for successfully completing the 
task, they will also have to either note by trial and error which display was most successful with a 
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given task, or they will use their cognitive resources to choose the superior display particular to the 
task. Thus, individuals who are given display choice will likely have higher mental workload relative 
to individuals who are not given display choice.  
H3: Users’ mental workload increases when they can choose their visual displays. 
2.2 Ambiguity Tolerance (AT) 
To maximize task performance, it is important not only to understand the inherent properties of the 
displays being used for a given purpose, but also to understand the properties of the user. For 
example, a painter may have trouble painting if given a pen. Likewise, the individual characteristics 
of display users may impact their choice of display as well as their engagement in the task. So, an 
individual’s openness to the given complexities of a display design or a task may impact that person’s 
ability to react to a situation. 
This research utilizes an extensive, relatively stable construct in cognitive psychology to represent an 
individual’s openness to the given complexities of a display design or a task – ambiguity tolerance 
(AT). Even the manner in which it is applied has little constraint; it can be thought of as a personality 
trait, a cognitive style, or a mechanism of defence (Frenkel-Brunswik 1948; Pratt 1980; Smock 1955). 
As a tolerant–intolerant continuum, AT first appeared in 1948 when Frenkel-Brunswik attempted to 
analyze the ethnocentric attitudes of 200 adolescents and 100 adults. She noted that prejudiced 
individuals are more inclined to the ―rigid social dichotomatizing‖ and ―premature reduction to 
certainty‖ of ambiguous stimuli. The next year, she published a paper to codify her construct, 
deeming AT as a personality variable that generalizes to the emotional and cognitive functioning of 
the individual (Frenkel-Brunswik 1949). However, it is conceivable that a third behavioral reaction 
could also be included in the manifestations of AT. 
Budner (1962) defined intolerance of ambiguity as ―the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as 
sources of threat‖ and ambiguity tolerance as ―the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as 
desirable.‖ Budner saw ambiguous situations as being novel (in which the individual can find no 
familiar cues), complex (in which the individual must consider a large number of cues), and insoluble 
or contradictory (in which cues conflict). He also hypothesized that individuals may react to 
ambiguity operationally or phenomenologically, referring to extrinsic and intrinsic reactions, 
respectively. Individuals low in AT, (LATs according to Budner), may react by denying the ambiguity 
or submitting to it operationally and phenomenologically, referring to extrinsic and intrinsic reactions 
respectively(Budner 1962). Thus, LATs may perceive that a situation is ambiguous, and then rigidly 
categorize the stimuli and cognitively submit to it, ignore the stimuli by cognitively denying it and 
become anxious about it, feel threatened by it and become angry with it, or emotionally submit to it 
(Bhushan et al. 1986; Grenier et al. 2005). 
Several researchers have noted that LATs reach premature perceptual closure (Frenkel-Brunswik 
1949) and maintain one solution—one that is likely low in ambiguity. Such a claim may imply that 
LATs qualify ambiguous stimuli perhaps before ascertaining sufficient information about those 
stimuli and, possibly, habitually react in the same way toward those stimuli. This hypothesis renders 
compelling implications for understanding problem-solving behavior. An LAT who perceives a 
problem as being ambiguous may not only misperceive the problem but also, rather than considering 
multiple solutions, may implement only one solution—likely the least ambiguous. 
Lowe and Reckers (1997) concluded that LATs ―tend to ignore other information such as the 
utilization of decision aids…and are more apt to close prematurely their decision process,‖ which 
implies that LATs may make rapid, impulsive decisions and that they rely less on external 
information when making their decisions. Several studies have also suggested an interaction between 
task preference and AT. Crandall (1968) found that LATs prefer familiar tasks, whereas high AT 
subjects (HATs) prefer novel tasks. Shaffer et al. (1973) found that LATs preferred tasks requiring 
lower mental effort. If LATs ignore external information and prefer familiar, low mental-effort tasks 
to unfamiliar, high mental-effort tasks, they are likely to reject the ambiguity (specifically, novelty, 
complexity, and insolubility) of unfamiliar displays that may be more appropriate to the given task, 
and likely to reject strategies important in problem-solving behavior. LATs will be more likely to 
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choose the same displays for each task, both because of familiarity bias and because they will not be 
as aware of the cues necessary to choose the display compatible with the task. Based on the 
discussions above, this research hypothesizes: 
H4: Compared with LATs, HATs will be more likely to choose a variety of displays when 
given a choice. 
H5: Compared with LATs, HATs will be less likely to choose a familiar display when given 
a choice. 
2.2.1 Ambiguity Tolerance and Decisional Performance 
Taube (1995) found that AT correlated strongly with need for cognition. He posited that HATs are 
more likely to engage in the solving, finding, and evaluation of tasks, while avoiding premature 
decisions. Many other researchers agree with this analysis (Schwenk 1982). If this is true, it may be 
conceived that LATs may not actively perceive an ambiguous situation as holistically as will their 
more tolerant counterparts, nor will they attempt to consider (and possibly understand) the more 
ambiguous aspects of a situation, but rather they will engage in premature closure in decision making. 
A considerable amount of research has noted performance differences between tolerant and intolerant 
individuals on a variety of tasks. In summary, LATs will likely be less aware of strategies important 
to the task and will probably not choose the display appropriate to the task; they will likely perform 
less accurately overall than HATs, especially when they choose their displays. This leads to the 
establishment of the following hypotheses: 
H6: LATs will likely perform less accurately than HATs on all tasks, across all conditions. 
H7: LATs will likely perform more quickly than HATs on all tasks, across all conditions. 
2.2.2 Ambiguity Tolerance and Stress 
Individuals who are intolerant of ambiguity may be more likely to perceive a problem as being 
ambiguous than those tolerant of ambiguity (Owen et al. 2002). So LATs possibly will react not only 
to ambiguous stimuli on cognitive, emotional, and behavioral domains; they will also be more likely 
to do so, even in conditions that more tolerant individuals may not perceive to be ambiguous. Several 
recent studies have included AT in their theories of generalized anxiety disorder (Dugas et al. 1997; 
Dugas et al. 1998). The former study identified ―cognitive avoidance,‖ or the avoidance of 
―threatening…images.‖ In the second study the authors stated, ―As a broad generalization, the 
relationship of…control to stress is…a function of the meaning of the control response to the 
individual.‖ Both statements sound significantly like descriptions of AT. Shaffer et al. (1973) found 
that LATs were less interested and more frustrated by high mental-effort tasks (compared with low 
mental-effort tasks). Conversely, HATs preferred and were more interested in high mental-effort tasks 
(compared with low mental-effort tasks). If the stated conclusions are true, HATs will likely perceive 
a given stimulus to be more ambiguous and—because of the above emotionally submissive 
manifestations of ambiguity intolerance—will be more anxious and perceive the given stimuli as more 
stressful. LATs will likely perceive the experiment to be more ambiguous than HATs and will likely 
have higher psychological stress across conditions. However, because LATs will hypothetically root 
themselves in familiarity, will choose displays that are highly familiar to them, and likely will not 
vacillate throughout the tasks, they will likely experience lower stress in the choice condition. HATs 
will likely experience a greater difference between choice–no-choice conditions, because they 
perceive the ambiguities of the task to be desirable. Thus, this research hypothesizes: 
H8: LATs will exhibit higher psychological stress across all conditions. 
2.2.3 Ambiguity Tolerance and Mental Workload 
Because HATs, compared with LATs, are consciously processing the tactics involved in the 
performance of the tasks, remembering and/or deciding which display is most appropriate for the 
given task, as well being cognizant of the cues involved in choosing the appropriate display (more so 
than individuals intolerant of ambiguity), it is likely that HATs will use more mental resources when 
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permitted to choose their display. As compared with LATs, HATs will experience a larger decrement 
in mental resource when they choose their displays than in conditions in which the best display is 
automatically administered. Furthermore, HATs will likely experience a marked decrease in the use of 
mental resources when given the known best display for the particular task (because of their increase 
in decision latitude). In summary, compared with LATs, HATs will likely have higher mental 
workload across conditions because they are processing more information relating to tasks. Compared 
with LATs, HATs will also experience a greater difference in mental workload use between 
conditions in which individuals choose their display versus conditions in which they do not get to 
choose, because they will be more likely to be processing the cues of choosing the display (as 
mentioned earlier).  
H9: HATs will experience higher mental workload across all conditions. 
3 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Participants 
Approximately 800 undergraduate college students enrolled in an introductory psychology course 
were pre-screened for ambiguity tolerance using Budner’s (1962) Scale of Intolerance-Tolerance of 
Ambiguity. Approximately 80 participants were randomly selected from the upper and lower quartiles 
of pre-screened ambiguity tolerance scores, and then called and invited to participate for three hours 
of experiment exposure credit in their course. Those who elected to participate were randomly 
assigned. This included approximately one-fourth of the HATs (17 randomly selected individuals who 
scored in the upper quartile of Budner’s scale), and one-fourth LATs (13 randomly selected 
individuals who scored in the lower quartile). 
3.2 Measurements 
3.2.1 Ambiguity Tolerance 
Budner’s Scale of Intolerance-Tolerance of Ambiguity was chosen to pre-screen for ambiguity 
tolerance. Although it is slightly less reliable than the AT-20 Scale, it differentiates between the types 
of ambiguity as well as the different reactions to ambiguity. Such differentiation is important for 
several reasons. One, our hypotheses depend on only one or two given possible reactions to ambiguity 
(i.e., phenomological and operative submission or denial). Also, the situations that we assume to be 
ambiguous may have been so based on only one of Budner’s dimensions of ambiguity (i.e., novelty, 
complexity, or insolubility). For this reason, it may be necessary to examine relationships between the 
individual’s scores on each differentiated item with both the corresponding dimension of ambiguity 
and behavioral reaction pertaining to the task context. For example, a given hypothesis is based on a 
participant’s anxious reaction, but if the participant’s questionnaire did not indicate that such a 
reaction should be expected (even though the participant may be considered intolerant), it may have 
diminished the effect size. 
3.2.2 Stress 
The SSSQ is a relatively new shortened version of the Dundee Stress Questionnaire. It asks 
participants to rate on a 1-5 Likert-type scale: 1 indicating that the question does not correspond to 
them, 5 indicating that the question strongly corresponds to them—their moods or feelings (i.e., 
happy, dissatisfied), confidence, motivation, goals, and standards. The scale was used to assess the 
participants’ psychological stress. Using factor analyses, previous domains were organized into three 
categories: engagement, worry, and distress (Helton et al. 2005). Engagement is considered to be the 
cognitive element of stress; distress is considered to be the affective element of stress; and worry is 
considered to be the cognitive element of stress (Helton et al. 2005). The above subscales were 
averaged to obtain the participants’ overall level of psychological stress. 
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3.2.3 Mental Workload 
The NASA-TLX was used to measure mental workload. This scale is subjective and 
multidimensional, designed to measure mental workload post-hoc. The participants were asked to rate 
their mental, physical, and temporal demands, their own performance, and their effort and frustration 
from 0 indicating virtually no demands to 100 indicting very high demands. Their overall scores can 
be calculated by averaging the above subscales. One dimension of NASA-TLX, physical workload, 
was eliminated because our focus was on mental workload. 
3.2.4 Decisional Performance 
Decisional performance was measured by two dimensions – speed and accuracy. The former was 
indicated by the reaction time for each participant to finish each block of tasks, whereas the latter was 
indicated by their average accuracy rates in answering each block of questions. 
3.3 Instruments 
3.3.1 Tasks 
We asked the participants to complete three tasks: the Every Other Building (EOB) task, the Spot the 
Plot (STP) task, and the Firefighting (Fire) task. Each task required the use of information from 
different dimensions. The EOB Task required the participants to make binary decisions on whether 
each display fit the following characteristic: whether security guards (marked as a white dot in each 
building) could reach buildings without security guards by crossing only one street, meaning that the 
security guards could not cross diagonally and could not cross multiple streets. The STP task required 
each participant to notice patterns based on height information. Such a distinction was based on the 
following criteria: whether the top three building floors were highlighted, the bottom three were 
highlighted, the middle three were highlighted, or no configuration was present (i.e., no pattern). The 
Fire task required the participants to use information from both the horizontal and the vertical planes. 
They were asked whether the firefighters (highlighted in yellow) would be able to reach a fire 
(indicated by a fire-shaped icon) with a hypothetical stream of water from all three directions, 
meaning that nothing would impede the flow. Also, the participants had to check whether at least one 
fire fighter was located on a floor above and on a floor below the fire. 
3.3.2 Displays 
Five displays were used to complete each task. The 3D display, the realistic display (Panel E, Figure 
2), is a computerized graphical image with approximately a 45-degree angle of orientation of a 
fictional urban area called College Branch, KY. Within the city were three main streets (Winchester, 
Ashland, and Frankfort) running at approximately a 45-degree angle, with three peripheral streets 
running perpendicular. Two elevation view displays included the Elevation Horizontal, (Panel D, 
Figure 2) in which the three main streets ran horizontally and the Elevation Vertical (Panel C, Figure 
2), in which the three main streets ran vertically. The elevation views were cross sections of each 
street, cut out as if the viewer were standing in front of the buildings. For participants to see 
information from the horizontal planes, they had to mentally integrate each street into a three-
dimensional mental model. The Plan Views (Panels A and B, Figure 2) were topographical views of 
College Branch, KY. They did not display height information. For participants to attain height 




Panel A – Plan View - Horizontal 
 
Panel B – Plan View - Vertical 
 
 
Panel C – Elevation View - Vertical 
 
Panel D – Elevation View - Horizontal 
 
 
Panel E - 3D View 
Figure 2 Visual Displays 
3.4 Experimental Procedure 
Participants within both conditions (i.e., choice and no-choice) were familiarized with each display. 
The experimenter used a PowerPoint presentation to explain what could be seen with each display as 
well as their orientation within each display. Participants then proceeded through practice tests in 
which they were informed that their data would not be recorded. Three different practice blocks were 
used, one for each task (the EOB task, the STP task, and the Fire task. Within each practice block, 
participants were given 20 different displays and randomly assigned a different display (3-D, both 
Elevation and Plan Views). After each trial, they were immediately given accuracy feedback. They 
were given 20 more trials, except with time constraints. After the practice tests (in both conditions), 
participants were given the NASA-TLX and the SSSQ. Participants were then encouraged to take a 
break to preserve their concentration. 
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The main experiment consisted of 12 blocks. Each block was composed of three task changes. Each 
task change represented five trials with each task. E-Prime randomly assigned the order of each task. 
So each block represented 15 trials, five trials of each task. For example, E-Prime may administer the 
Fire task for task change 1, the STP task for task change 2, and the EOB task for task change 3 on 
block 1, but the EOB task for task change 1, the Fire task for task change 2, and the STP task for task 
change 3 on block 2. Within the main experiment, participants were not given accuracy feedback until 
each block was complete (that is, after they completed all five trials for all three tasks). The NASA-
TLX and SSSQ were re-administered after the sixth block of the main experiment. After the 12th 
block of the main experiment, we re-administered the NASA-TLX and SSSQ, administered the 
manipulation check, and gathered descriptive data. We then debriefed and dismissed the participants. 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 User Discretion 
Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2 examined the impacts of user discretion on decisional performance, which 
was measured by two dimensions – accuracy and speed. As indicated in Table 1, participants with 
choices on visual displays demonstrated slightly higher accuracy rate (not significant) and spent more 
time on answering questions in each block of experiments (not significant). Inconsistent with the 
prediction of Hypothesis 2, participants with choices on visual displays showed significantly higher 
stress than those without choices (p = .02). The difference in mental workload between two groups 
was not significant, inconsistent with Hypothesis 3. 
 
 Choice (n = 15) No-Choice (n = 15) 
F 
Sig. 
(1-tailed) Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error 
Accuracy 10.04 .21 9.89 .23 .243 0.31 
Reaction Time (in ms) 32814.44 2753.80 30678.02 2953.12 .280 0.30 
Stress 12701.04 1833.78 7052.22 1966.50 4.414 0.02** 
Mental Workload 49.62 3.27 49.30 3.51 .004 0.47 
Table 1 The Effects of User Discretion 
4.2 Ambiguity Tolerance 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that HATs will be more likely to choose a variety of displays when given a 
choice. As indicated in Table 2, HATs, on average, chose 3.75 displays out of 5 possible selections, 
whereas LATS chose 3.43. Although the direction was consistent with the prediction, the difference 
was not significant (p = .29). Hypothesis 5 tested whether HATs will be less likely to choose a 
familiar display than LATs (i.e., plan view). The average frequency of HATs to choose plan view 
displays was 46.2%, slightly lower than that of LATs (43.7%). The difference was not significant. 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 examined the associations between ambiguity tolerance and decisional 
performance. On average, HATs answered 10.24 questions correctly, slightly more than LATs did 
(9.81). The difference was not significant; thus, Hypothesis 6 was not supported. HATs spent 36,585 
ms in answering questions in each block, marginally faster than LATs did (28,528 ms; p = .06). 
As predicted in Hypothesis 8, LATs demonstrated significantly higher stress (2.33) than HATs did 
(2.10; p = .03). The direction of Hypothesis 9 was correct but not significant because HATs’ mental 
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H4: A>B .330 .29 

































(.133) H8: A,C < B, D 3.75 .03** 







(6.505) H9: A, C> B, D .135 .36 
Table 2 The Effects of Ambiguity Tolerance 
5 LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Limitations 
As the first step of a program of study, this research collected only 30 participants to examine the 
impacts of ambiguity tolerance and user discretion on spatial task performance and display choices. 
The small sample size might explain why several hypotheses showed only correct directions but not 
significance. 
When investigating whether user discretion contributes to decision makers’ accuracy, we assumed 
that the chosen visual displays were appropriate enough to answer questions in each block. However, 
such assumption is a trade-off of experimental simplicity; otherwise, the 2X2 design should have been 
expanded as 2 (HAT vs. LAT) X2 (Choice or Not) X2 (Can or Cannot Choose Appropriate Displays) 
This research failed to include some interesting and important impacts of ambiguity tolerance and 
user discretion. For example, the pattern of participants’ display choices may show the influences of 
learning effects. Because the sample size was constrained, we did not examine interactions in this 
study. 
5.2 Conclusions 
Similar to Wilson and Zigurs (1999), we found in this research that user discretion on display choices 
does not improve users’ decisional accuracy significantly, suggesting that display choice behavior 
may be considerably more complex than originally conceived. Refining the research design, adding 
other control variables, or increasing sample size may help explore the association between user 
discretion and decisional accuracy. As expected, offering user discretion lengthened decision makers’ 
reaction time. Whether such delay is a justifiable exchange for better decisional accuracy is an 
interesting and practical research question, especially when both accuracy and speed are important 
(e.g., emergency rescue). Inconsistent with the literature, this research showed that user discretion 
significantly increased users’ stress. Future studies should further scrutinize the discrepancy.  
This research is one of the first studies to utilize ambiguity tolerance (AT), an extensive, relatively 
stable construct in cognitive psychology to represent individuals’ openness to the given complexities 
of a display design or a task. The overall results suggest that AT can be appropriate for capturing 
individuals’ innovativeness or willingness to change. 
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